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Many regions such as the European Union and states in the U.S. have introduced mandates aimed 
at restricting carbon emissions. On the other hand, the stated goal of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) which provides the science behind the current global climate 
negotiations is to stabilize the atmospheric stock of carbon. How do these multiple pollution 
control efforts interact when the same nonrenewable resource (e.g., coal) creates the externality? 
In this paper we show that environmental mandates that aim to reduce emissions and those 
aiming to limit the stock of pollution, may not compliment each other. For example, a stricter 
emissions mandate may actually increase the global pollution stock and hasten the date when the 
global pollution mandate becomes binding. A stricter local mandate will lead to the global 
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While a global agreement on controlling greenhouse gas emissions has been largely elusive, this 
issue is being actively addressed at the regional and local levels. For example, in the United 
States and the European Union, many states and member countries have developed their own 
clean carbon policies and targets.
 At last count, 29 US states have implemented local measures 
that aim to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from electric utilities and trucks, buses and sport 
utility vehicles, as part of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and the Western 
Climate Initiative that includes several states such as California and Arizona as well as provinces 
from Canada.
2 The European Union has implemented carbon emission caps under the European 
Trading System (ETS) which have been operational for some time. On the other hand, at the 
global level, a stated goal of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPPC) which 
provides the science behind the international negotiations on climate change is a stabilization of 
pollution concentration (for the IPCC‟s atmospheric stabilization goals, see IPCC (2001).
3  
 
These environmental mandates, both at the global and at the local level, are imposed based on 
scientific evidence and a host of other considerations. The goal of the IPCC is to limit the rise in 
earth temperatures to less than 2 degree Celsius. This roughly translates to a stock of carbon in 
the atmosphere of 400-450 parts per million. On the other hand, local regulations are mostly 
aimed at emission reductions and are the outcomes of a legislative process that takes into account 
damages as well as economic efficiency and distributional issues. For example, the RGGI has a 
declared goal of reducing emissions from the power sector by 10% by the year 2018.
4   
 
                                                 
2 During the regime of President George W. Bush, while the US was cool towards ratifying the Kyoto Protocol or 
negotiating another international climate treaty, several states went ahead unilaterally to start an emissions cap and 
trade program in the North-East, which became known as the RGGI. This program has resulted in measurable 
emission reductions as well as generating modest revenues from the auctioning of carbon permits. 
3 NASA Chief Climate Scientist James Hansen writes “If humanity wishes to preserve a planet similar to that on 
which civilization developed and to which life on Earth is adapted, paleoclimatic evidence and ongoing climate 
change suggest that CO2 will need to be reduced from its current 385 ppm to at most 350 ppm” (Hansen et al., 2008, 
pp. 1).  
4 See http://www.rggi.org/home. Renewable Fuel Standards are yet another example of a mandate which specifies 
the share of renewable fuels in transportation. 3 
 
In this paper, we focus on the interaction between a global mandate that aims to stabilize the 
stock of carbon in the atmosphere, and a local mandate that focuses on reduction of emissions or 
flows. This is especially relevant in the case of climate change because the externality is 
produced from the burning of nonrenewable resources such as coal and oil.
5 We investigate the 
joint effects of these two policies in a dynamic setting. In our model, global targets on the stock 
of pollution and local limits on emissions are directly linked, because both are caused by the use 
of a nonrenewable resource.  
 
Specifically, the question we ask is: How do these mandates affect each other, as well as resource 
use and pollution over time?  Can action at one level mitigate the need for action at the other 
level? That is, does tightening local action alleviate the need for global action on pollution? 
Under what conditions might an externality be regulated both locally and globally or through 
only one of these two means?  
 
The main counter-intuitive result from our analysis is that tightening a mandate at one level may 
actually exacerbate pollution problems at another level. For example, a stricter global mandate on 
the stock of pollution may reduce fossil fuel prices and increase pollution flows over some other 
time period. Moreover, under some conditions, tightening a local emissions mandate may imply 
that the global mandate binds earlier in time. A general result is that a stricter local mandate will 
lead to the global mandate binding for a longer time period and a delay in the ultimate transition 
to a clean substitute.  
 
When the reserves of the polluting resource (e.g., coal) are large, a local mandate kicks in at the 
beginning of the time horizon and the global mandate binds only later in time. In general, local 
mandates when binding, help slow the growth of global emissions and may delay the time when 
the global cap becomes binding. However once the global mandate is in place, there is no role for 
the local mandate any more. The latter becomes redundant. From a policy point of view, these 
results suggest that it may be important to develop local instruments relatively earlier in the 
planning horizon, which in turn may provide policy makers the much needed breathing space to 
                                                 
5 Fossil fuels which are nonrenewable, account for 75% of global emissions, rest being mainly deforestation. 4 
 
organize an agreement that develops a global cap on the pollution stock.
 6 
 
These results also imply that multiple pollution mandates may not achieve the shared objective of 
pollution reduction, and may need to be coordinated at the local and global levels. In the absence 
of coordination, a policy change at one level may worsen pollution problems at another level, 
because of the dynamic interactions between the two policies.
7 
 
Each of the mandates, local and global can be implemented through tax policies. We show that 
the local pollution tax declines monotonically until the mandate does not bind anymore. 
However, the global tax increases from the beginning until the mandate becomes binding, when it 
starts declining and eventually goes to zero when the mandate no longer binds. Thus in a permit 
market, the price of pollution under a local mandate will decline, while under a global mandate, it 
rises and then falls, peaking once the local mandate is no longer binding.
8   
 
There is a large literature in public economics that deals with local and global jurisdictional 
issues focusing on pollution taxes and distributional consideration (Caplan and Silva 2005). Other 
studies have focused on strategic problems in transboundary pollution (List and Mason, 2001). 
Yet other papers have dealt with taxes in general equilibrium (Fullerton and Heutel, 2010). None 
of these literatures focus on dynamics or pollution from a nonrenewable resource. An important 
methodological goal of the paper is to develop a model that can integrate strands of the literature 
on nonrenewable resources in which either stock (as in Chakravorty, Magne and Moreaux, 2006) 
or emission mandates (such as in Amigues et al (1998) and Smulders and Van der Werf (2006)) 
have been modeled.  
 
Section 2 develops the Hotelling model with a local emissions mandate and a global mandate on 
                                                 
6 Some economists have offered this idea as a policy proposal, although for different reasons. Jeffrey Frankel (2009) 
suggests that one way to get developing countries to sign in is to have developed economies follow emission 
reduction targets for a period followed by global mandates for all countries. That is, a period with regional mandates 
in regions such as the EU and North America, followed by a global mandate. 
7We take the mandates as the pre-determined outcome of some complex political economy process so that we can 
focus on the dynamics of prices and resource allocation. This may be a reasonable approximation for issues such as 
climate change, where the degree of uncertainty is large, and negotiations have historically focused on mandates 
driven by scientific studies. 
8 There is a large literature on the taxation of nonrenewables under pollution assuming explicit damage functions 
(see, e.g., Ulph and Ulph, 1994). The path of taxes over time depends largely upon the specification of damages. 5 
 
pollution stocks. Section 3 discusses the effects of the two types of mandates on the use of the 
polluting resource and arrival of the clean substitute. Section 4 examines the effect of tightening 
the local and global mandates on the equilibrium stock of pollution and resource prices. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. The Model 
We adopt the standard Hotelling model in which a social planner derives utility from using a 
polluting nonrenewable resource. Let us call it coal. The utility function is given by  () uqwhere 
q is the flow of energy at time t. This function is assumed strictly increasing and concave and 
satisfies the Inada condition  0 lim ( ) q uq    . Let p denote the function  () uq   and let the 
corresponding demand function, the inverse of  () uq  , be denoted by () Dp. Under the above 
assumptions,  () Dp is well defined over some  0 ( , ) p  where  00 lim ( ), 0
q p u q p

  . 
 
The initial stock of coal is assumed known and is denoted by 0 X . Let () Xtbe the residual stock of 
coal at time tand  () xt be the instantaneous extraction rate. Then 
 
( ) ( ) X t x t  .                   (1) 
 
Let the extraction and processing cost of coal be a constant  x c . Let  () zt be the emission from 
burning coal, and we assume that one unit of coal leads to b pollution units, that is  ( ) ( ) z t bx t  . 
However, b does not really play any significant role in the subsequent analysis, so we equate it to 
unity by appropriate choice of units.
9 Then  ( ) ( ) z t x t  . Each unit of coal creates one unit of 
pollution. Pollution emissions can thus be written in resource units.  
 
Pollution flow is subject to a local cap  () x t x  . We interpret the emissions cap as a „local‟ 
mandate. However, this policy need not be strictly local. Any policy that limits emissions will 
suffice, such as restricting the use of a pollutant (e.g., sulphur) whose emissions are perfectly 
correlated with the burning of the fossil fuel. In Appendix A, we show that multiple homogenous 
                                                 
9 The complete analysis for  1 b  can be obtained by writing to the authors. 6 
 
regions with emission mandates can be aggregated into a single region. Then the mandated level 
of coal use is given by xand we can define the corresponding price as () p u x   . If p were lower 
than  x c then no coal will be burned since the price will be below the cost of extraction. The flow 
of emissions will not exceed the mandated level.  
 
Apart from local externalities, the burning of coal leads to the build-up of the stock of carbon 
leading to global pollution, such as from warming of the planet. For simplicity, we assume that 
these global damages can only be capped by some central authority. This may be a federal agency 
such as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for domestic pollutants or a world body 
such as the IPCC that sets mandates on global pollution stocks.
10  Define the stock of pollution at 
time tfrom coal burning by () Zt. Then the build-up of pollution is given by 
  
( ) , Z t x Z  
                  (2) 
  
where 0 Z is the initial stock of pollution, which is exogenously given. Let the mandated level of 
the pollution stock be given byZ .That is,  () Z t Z  and  0 ZZ  .
11 We can compute the maximum 
quantity of coal that can be used while satisfying the global mandate, derived from (1) as xZ  
. Define the corresponding price of energy as () p u x    . We must have  x cp   in order to burn 
coal before the global mandate is achieved. Note that  pp   iff  x Z x   .  
 
Let there be a backstop resource which is pollution free. Let () yt denote consumption of this 
resource and  y c its unit cost of production. For convenience we will call this clean resource, solar 
energy. We make the usual assumption that the unit cost of extraction of coal is lower than the 
                                                 
10 Sometimes, the same polluting source may create different externalities at the local and global level. For example, 
the burning of coal produces both sulphur and carbon. The flow of sulphur creates local and regional externalities 
such as acid rain, and also adds to the stock of carbon in the atmosphere. Yang (2007) addresses the management of 
short-lived local externalities like sulphur and long-lived global externalities such as greenhouse gases in a static 
framework. 
11 The mandate may represent some stylized damage function beyond which damages are expected to be inordinately 
large, such as 450 ppm. Introducing an explicit damage function will introduce complications in the analysis, and its 
second and third derivative are likely to play a critical role.  7 
 
cost of using solar energy, i.e.,  xy cc  . These resources are perfect substitutes so that total 
energy consumption at any time is given by ( ) ( ) ( ) q t x t y t  . Let y be the given available flow of 
solar energy. Then we assume that () y y D c  , i.e., there is sufficient solar energy to supply the 
entire demand at its unit cost. Under these assumptions, there is no scarcity rent in the solar 
industry. 
 
Given a discount rate  0 r  , the social planner chooses the energy mix by maximizing the 




[ ( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )]
rt
xy xy Max u x t y t c x t c y t e dt

    
           (3) 
 
subject to (1) and (2). For convenience we use    as the multiplier function attached to (2) so 
that the value of  is positive. The Lagrangian may then be written as   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , x y x y L u x y c x c y x x Z x x Z Z x y                      
 
which yields the necessary conditions 
 
() xx u x y c           
 
            (4) 
  () yy u x y c     
                  (5) 
 
together with the complementary slackness conditions 
 











    
  
                 (6)     
 




           
        (7) 
( )  and r       
       
          (8) 
( ) 0, 0, 0. Z Z Z Z      
     
        (9) 
 
Finally the transversality conditions arelim ( ) ( ) 0and lim ( ) ( ) 0.
tt t X t t Z t 
   The variable  () t  is 
the scarcity rent of the nonrenewable resource and () t  which is positive represents the price of a 
unit of pollution as a result of the global cap. Note that we also have which is the cost of the 
local cap – thus we have two types of carbon prices in our model, which may be interpreted as 
taxes. Both are per unit of pollution:  is the price per unit of emissions as a result of the global 
mandate, and is the price due to the local mandate. If the global cap is slack over any period of 
time  01 [ , ] t t t   then  ( ) 0 t    so that
0 ( )( )
0 ( ) ( )
r t t t t e
 
   during that time period. If  0 ZZ  , that 
is, if the initial stock of pollution is strictly lower than the mandate, then  () t   must increase 
exponentially over an initial time period until the global cap is reached. Finally, if the global 
mandate is no longer binding after some time t, then the shadow price of the pollution stock must 
be zero beyond t. 
 
3. Energy Supply under the Two Mandates 
Without any mandate on the flow or stock of emissions, coal will supply all the energy until it is 
completely exhausted and then solar energy will take over. The price of coal will increase over 
time, hence extraction and emissions (which are proportional) will decrease. Thus emissions will 
be at a maximum at the initial time  0 t  . This suggests that if the local mandate were to be 
binding, it must be at the beginning of the program. But it is not clear whether the stock of 
pollution will also be maximum at the initial time. If at time  0 t  ,  (0) xZ   , that is, initial 
emissions are below the natural dilution level, then by (2) the stock of pollution will be 
permanently decreasing from its initial value  0 Z . If not, the stock of pollution will increase 
initially. 
 
To make the problem non-trivial, let us assume that the local and global mandates  x and Z  are 9 
 
sufficiently strict, or alternatively, coal is abundant or dirty,
12 so that at least one of the caps will 
bind. 
 
A Strict Local Mandate Makes the Global Mandate Redundant 
Consider the case  xx   or equivalently,  pp  . This may occur when the local mandate is strict 
relative to the global one. For example, a region may care more for its own environmental quality 
than for the global stock of pollution, or pollution damages may be higher at the local level (e.g., 
densely populated areas) requiring a stricter cap. The above inequality implies that  x x Z   so 
that if the local mandate is satisfied, then starting from the initial pollution stock   0 ZZ  , the 
stock must always stay under the global capZ . Because of the local cap, emissions will never 
reach the level allowed at the global cap. The global mandate will never bind and it is therefore 
redundant. We can discuss the following three cases: 
 
A Cheap Clean Substitute 
It turns out that the critical parameter that determines the order of extraction is the cost of solar 
energy. If solar were sufficiently cheap, satisfying the condition  y cp  , then the program could 
use solar energy along with cheap coal (recall that  xy cc  ). Thus it is easy to conclude that coal 
will be used at the maximum mandated level  x , and residual demand will be supplied by the 
more expensive solar energy, given by () y D c x  . This path is followed until all coal is exhausted 
at time T beyond which only solar energy is used. The energy price and extraction paths are 
shown in Fig. 1. 
 
The price of energy is constant and equal to  y c . It cannot rise above  y c because ultimately solar 
must become the sole supplier of energy. Solar energy must be employed at the onset because the 
price p when coal is constrained is higher than the price of solar ( y cp  ). Both the Hotelling 
solution (with no mandate) and the solution under a local cap are shown in Fig.1. The initial 
shadow price of coal 0 
 must be lower than 0
H  , its level in an unconstrained (without a local  
                                                 
12 Since the pollution units are normalized so that  1 b  , dirty coal would also mean abundance of the resource. 10 
 
 
Fig.1. Local Mandate with a Cheap Substitute: Both Coal and Solar are used at the beginning 
 
mandate) model, where the superscript H represents the pure Hotelling solution. The Hotelling 
shadow price must be bounded above by the extraction cost differential between the two 
resources, so we have 00
H
yx cc 
    . As shown in the figure, solar energy kicks in from the 
beginning and the resource is exhausted later under the mandate. Thus it takes longer for the 
clean energy to supply the entire market. 
 
An Expensive Clean Substitute 
We now consider the case y pc  , i.e., the price at which emissions are mandated is too low for 
solar to be competitive. This situation may arise when the local mandate is relatively lax or the 
cost of solar energy is too high. Then the only feasible option is to burn coal at the allowed level, 
until some time  1 t . The price of energy during this first interval is p . Beyond this time, the price 
of energy rises and extraction of coal declines but solar is still not competitive since its price is 
higher. Finally coal is exhausted exactly when the price of energy reaches  y c and solar supplies 
all energy at that price. Fig. 2 shows the corresponding price and resource use paths.  
 
 
   
 













Fig.2. Local Mandate with an Expensive Substitute: Coal is used for an Extended Period 
 
 
In the first phase when only coal is used, the price of energy is constant at p . This price is higher 
than the unrestricted price  0
rt
x ce 
  and the difference is given by the local pollution tax 
0 ( ) ( ) 0
rt
x t p c e 
      . At the end of the phase at time  1 t , the value of this multiplier is zero. 
The interval  1 [ , ) tTis a pure Hotelling phase in which the price of coal increases and extraction 
declines below the mandated level since the price of energy is now higher than p . The local tax is 
zero in this period and 0 ( ) ( ) 0
rt
y y x t c c e 
      . At T the price of energy finally reaches the 
cost of the backstop  y c and coal is completely exhausted at this instant, with all supply switching 
to the clean solar energy. 
 
Compared to no cap, the local mandate on emissions has the effect of initially decreasing coal use 
(check Fig. 2). Note that the emissions mandate actually delays the time when the clean resource 
becomes economically competitive because all of the fossil fuel must be used up. In both of these 
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mandated cap. In the next section, we consider the case when a local mandate is unable to prevent 
the global mandate from becoming binding.  
 
Both Local and Global Mandates Apply 
We now assume that the local mandate is not stringent enough to make the global one redundant. 
More precisely, pp  and equivalentlyxx  , that is, in spite of being under a local cap, the 
stock of pollution may still rise to hit the global cap. The analysis here depends again on the cost 
of the clean substitute. So we can discuss three cases: when the substitute is cheap, moderately 
expensive and expensive, respectively. 
 
Cheap Substitute 
By a cheap substitute, we mean the following inequality: xy c c p p    . Solar energy is cheap 
enough that it can be used under both the local and global mandate. When y cp  , we saw earlier 
that coal is first used at the locally mandated rate with the residual demand supplied by solar 
energy. This path is maintained until coal is completely exhausted. The question that we need to 
ask now is: how is the stock of carbon affected and when is the globally mandated cap attained, if 
at all? 
 
During the phase when coal is used under a local cap, we know from (2) that the stock of 
pollution accumulates according to ) ( ) (
0
0 
  d e x Z e t Z
t
t   
 . The first exponential term on the 
right hand side represents the natural dilution effect over the pollution stock. The second term 
denotes aggregate emissions from burning coal. Solving this equation yields
0 ( ) ( )
t xx
Z t Z e






   . The first term on the 
right hand side in the equation for () Ztis negative and decreasing in absolute value. Thus the 
aggregate stock of pollution () Ztis increasing and approaches 
x





Consider increasing the initial stock of coal, 0 X . Ceteris paribus, if the stock is relatively small, 
the cumulative stock of pollution () Ztmay not reach the mandateZ . Coal may be exhausted 
earlier. Then the global cap will never bind. The solution will be exactly as described in Fig.1. 
However with an increased initial endowment of coal, there exists a critical stock level (call it 
0 X ) such that for reserves higher than 0 X , the global mandate will indeed bind. Consider the time 
2 t when the stock of pollution hits the mandateZ . Before 2 t the local emissions mandate binds 
and after  2 t the global cap on stock binds. Beginning with time 2 t coal use must be constrained to
x , and the excess demand given by () y D c x  is supplied by solar energy. This period of joint use 






The new insight from this solution is that now that the global cap binds, the price of pollution is 



















Fig.3.  R esource Use und er both L ocal  and Global  Mandates: Abundant Co al and 
Cheap Substitute 




rises exponentially. In the second time period starting from  2 t , the tax starts declining since (9) 
holds and the multiplier on the global cap is strictly positive. The tax rate on pollution falls until 
it is zero at T when the cap ceases to bind and a complete transition to solar occurs. 
 
Moderately Expensive Substitute 
Moderately expensive solar energy implies the following inequality: xy c p c p    . Solar is too 
expensive to be used under the local mandate but not under the global. To examine this case, 
consider the solution shown in Fig. 2 in which coal is used for a period of time at the local cap 
until a Hotelling segment kicks in. From (4), the energy price path once the local cap is no longer 




x p t c e e
 
    . If initial 
endowments of coal increase, then the scarcity rent of coal must decline, leading to a decrease in 
the price of energy and an extended stay at the local cap. Recall that in this period coal use is 
constant at the local cap. As in the case of a cheap substitute, abundant coal will mean a 
prolonged first period, and will lead to a sufficiently large stock of pollution so that the global 
mandate binds. The question is when. Note that if no solar is used, then the price of energy must 
reach p but that is strictly greater than y c . So the global mandate must be achieved when the price 
of energy is  y c and some solar energy will be used at the global cap. Thus in order for the global 
mandate to bind, the energy price must rise from p to  y c as shown in Fig.4. Because both 
resources are being used at the global cap, the energy price is  y c which is lower than p . 
 
In Fig.4, there is a first phase  1 [0, ] t with constant extraction of coal at the local cap, then the price 
rises to equal the cost of the substitute during a second phase  12 [ , ] tt , and finally the extraction of 
coal is limited to that allowed under the global cap, until complete exhaustion of coal and 
substitution by solar energy at timeT . The local mandate helps delay the onset of the global 
mandate by putting a cap on emissions early in the program. However, once the global mandate 






The case with an expensive substitute satisfies the following inequality: xy c p p c    . Thus 
solar energy is too expensive at the global cap, only coal must be used. When the price of energy 
increases from p to y c , only coal must be used in this transition phase, since solar will still be 
economically infeasible. During this transition, price of coal will rise, hence emissions will be 
lower than the maximum allowed under the global mandate, so the latter will not be binding. The 
 
Fig.4. Both Local and Global Mandates and a Moderately Expensive Substitute with Abundant 
Coal: Both Resources are used at the Global Cap. 
 
extraction profile and price paths are shown in Fig. 5.  
 
At the beginning, the local cap holds, followed by a period when prices rise until the global cap is 
attained during which coal is used at a constant maximal rate. Finally the price rises again and the 
stock of pollution declines from the globally mandated level until coal is completely exhausted 
exactly when the price of energy equals the cost of the clean substitute. 
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nonrenewable resource? Firstly, mandates of either type will postpone the date of exhaustion of 
the nonrenewable and delay the complete transition to the clean substitute. Secondly, the local 
mandate always kicks in before the global one takes effect. Both cannot occur simultaneously. 
Third, the local mandate may in some situations, render the global mandate redundant. Fourth, 




Fig.5. Both Local and Global Mandates with Abundant Coal and an Expensive Substitute 
 
 
We can summarize as follows: 
Proposition 1: (a) Both local and global mandates postpone the date of exhaustion of the 
resource and (b) delay the full transition to the clean substitute. (c) The local mandate always 
binds before the global and (d) both cannot be binding at the same time. (e) The local mandate 
may make the global one redundant and finally (d) both mandates help move up the deployment 
of the clean substitute, especially when the substitute is low cost.  
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4. Dynamic Interaction between the Local and Global Mandates 
In this section, we discuss how the local and global mandates interact with each other. Intuitively 
it seems that a local emissions mandate when binding will reduce carbon emissions and therefore 
will also lead to a reduction of the pollution stock. This idea is at the heart of current climate 
policies which try to reduce the carbon concentration in the atmosphere by reducing the 
emissions of greenhouse gases. However an emissions cap even if binding only for a time, will  
have dynamic effects upon the entire time path. We show that an emissions mandate may lead to 
an increase in the global carbon tax, and conversely, a global mandate may lead to a higher local  
emissions tax. 
 
Either an Emissions or a Stock Mandate 
In order to drive intuition, let us first consider each type of regulation in isolation. Consider the 
case shown in Fig.2 where the clean substitute is costly.
13 Suppose the policy maker were to 
impose a stricter mandate on emissions,  xx  .This would mean a higher price of energy pp  . 
Intuitively, we expect that this stricter local mandate will reduce the scarcity rent of the 
nonrenewable resource.
14 This implies a decline in energy prices once the cap is no longer 
binding, since 0 ()
rt
x p t c e   . This has two consequences. 
 
Firstly, since p increases and () pt decreases, the period during which the local mandate binds will 
increase from  1 t  to  1 t (see Fig. 6). As expected, a stricter local mandate means that it binds  
for a longer time. However, with a lower energy price, the use of the resource increases and it is 
exhausted later in time. 
 
Moreover, a stricter mandate causes resource use to be transferred to the future, when the cap is 
no longer binding. This suggests, as we will see later, that a stricter emissions mandate may result 
in a higher stock of pollution later in time. This is a first hint that a tight local mandate may not 
automatically reduce the need for a global mandate. As shown in Fig.6, the full introduction of 
the clean substitute is delayed under a stricter emissions cap. 
                                                 
13 We do not consider all the possible solutions because some are straightforward or isomorphic to cases already 
described. 
14 We show this formally in Appendix B. 18 
 
 
Fig. 6. Stricter Local Mandate leads to a Longer Period when the Mandate binds and a Delay in 
the Arrival of the Clean Substitute 
 
Now consider a stricter global mandate on the pollution stock. Let ZZ
  which in turn leads to a  
higher energy price at the global cap denoted by pp  . As before, the stricter mandate means a 
lower scarcity rent for coal. On the other hand the more stringent cap will increase the pollution 
tax. 
 
To fix ideas, consider the case of an expensive substitute shown previously in Fig.5. The global 
cap (in the period  23 [ , ] tt) is sandwiched between two unconstrained periods,  12 [ , ] tt  and  2 [ , ] tT. 
Intuition suggests that lowering the mandate will lead to a reallocation of coal use from the cap 
period to the adjoining two periods which are under no binding mandates. Since the post-mandate 
phase is pure Hotelling, we can conclude that because a stricter mandate means a lower resource 
rent, the overall use of coal will increase during this period.  
 
Because the capped energy price p increases (see Fig.7) while the energy price decreases during 
the phase  3 [ , ] tT, time  3 t will increase to  33 tt    . The exhaustion of coal is also delayed until 
TT  . Tightening the global mandate again delays the transition towards clean energy.  
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one hand the initial scarcity rent of coal 0   goes down because of the stricter mandate. However, 
the stricter mandate also implies a higher pollution tax 0  . The overall effect on the price of 




x p t c e e
 
    is ambiguous. Fig. 7 shows the case 
when the ceiling arrival occurs earlier in time as a result of the stricter mandate.  
 
Fig.7. Stricter Global Mandate leads to Higher Emissions at the Beginning and an Early Arrival 
at the Cap 
 
Here the decline of the resource rent dominates the increase in the pollution tax. This will result 
in a decline in the initial price of energy. But the tax grows at rate ( r   ) which is higher than 
the growth rate of scarcity rent (rate r ), hence the new price grows faster, as shown. The new 
price path must cut the old path from below, since pp  . Note from the figure that the net result 
is that a stricter global cap implies higher coal use and emissions at the beginning, which is 
counter-intuitive. 
 
The figure shows an earlier arrival at the global cap ( 22 tt   ). So the time spent at the global cap 
is higher. However, the reallocation of resources as a result of the tighter mandate to the time 
periods before and after may also result in an alternative outcome – a late arrival at the cap with 
an ambiguous effect upon the time length of the ceiling period.
15  
 
                                                 












In summary, the effect of a stricter global mandate depends on several factors. There is a global 
redistribution of resource use. The pollution tax increases and the scarcity rent decreases. The 
curvature of the demand function near the ceiling price p plays a role. The new energy price rises 
faster than the old one. However, the starting price may be lower, in which case initial emissions 
increase as a result of a tightening mandate. 
 
Both Emissions and Stock Mandates Combined 
The goal of this section is to show that counterintuitive results may obtain when local and global 
mandates are considered jointly. 
 
Tightening a Local Mandate 
Consider again the solution shown in Fig.5. Over a first time interval  1 [0, ] t , only the emissions 
cap is binding. During  12 [ , ] tt , it no longer binds but over  23 [ , ] tt, the stock mandate is binding. 
Finally over the interval  3 [ , ] tTresource extraction follows a Hotelling path with no binding 
mandate until transition to the backstop at timeT . Suppose that we tighten the emissions mandate 
from  x to  xx    . Then we can summarize the results as follows: 
 
Proposition 2: Tightening a local mandate implies (a) a decrease in resource rents and (b) an 
increase in emissions taxes; (c) both local and global caps end later in time; (d) the transition to 
the clean substitute is delayed; (e) the global pollution tax may increase and (f) the global cap 
may arrive later.  
Proof : See Appendix. 
 
We use the insights obtained from the earlier discussion on the effect of the two individual 
mandates to present some intuition.
16 As before, even with both mandates in place, tightening the 
local mandate will imply lower resource rents. This leads to a lower price of coal: 0
rt
x ce   . So 
in the Hotelling phase, cumulative coal use will increase. Since p and y c are unchanged, the global 
cap will end later in time and the transition to clean energy will be delayed.  
 
                                                 
16 Technical material is relegated to the Appendix. 21 
 
What is the effect of a stricter local mandate on the global pollution tax ? It all depends on how 
the tighter mandate will shift resource use out of the local cap period. For example, some 
resources are shifted to the last period  3 [ , ] tT, and others to the intermediate period  12 [ , ] tt  neither 
of which have binding caps. If a large amount of coal is transferred to the last period, less is 
moved to the initial period, and so the pollution tax is increased (see Fig.8).  
 
 
Fig.8. The Global Cap is reached earlier with a stricter Local Cap: 
Global and Local Taxes both go up. 
 
However, if more coal is moved to the initial period, the pollution tax increase is small and is 
dominated by the fall in resource rents. Then the new energy price is lower but rises rapidly due 
to a higher . Then  1 t will increase and  2 t will decrease. That is, a tighter local cap leads to a 
faster accumulation of pollution and early arrival at the global cap. Several factors may lead to 
this outcome, including a higher atmospheric pollution dilution rate  . If this rate is high, it 
provides an incentive to increase the stock of pollution quickly, to make use of costless dilution. 
So more resources are transferred to the beginning than towards the end of the extraction period. 
This case is shown in Fig. 8. However if the two price paths do not cut then the global cap comes 
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A Stricter Global Mandate 
When both mandates are imposed, tightening the global mandate leads to the following: 
 
Proposition 3: Tightening the global mandate implies (a) a decline in resource rents (b) increase 
in the global pollution tax (c) a delay in the arrival of the clean substitute, and (d) the global cap 
ceases to bind later in time. It has an indeterminate effect on (e) the arrival time of the global cap 
and (f) the local pollution tax.  
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
As before, resource rents decline with a stricter global mandate and resources become cheaper. 
However, the global carbon tax must increase, since the mandate is more strict. Because of the 
cheaper fossil fuel, the pure Hotelling phase of resource extraction is pushed back in time as well 
as the arrival of the clean substitute.
17 
 
Compared to the previous analysis, the difference here is that the price at the global cap is higher, 
as in Fig.7. So if more coal has to be burnt elsewhere, it has to be either after the global cap or 
only at the beginning of the unconstrained time period  12 [ , ] tt  since the terminal price during this 
interval at time  2 t must be  p, higher than before.  If the first effect is relatively large, the 
pollution tax increase is small. So the fall in resource rent dominates and 1 () pt declines. Since p
stays the same,  1 t will increase. Because the energy price falls, the local pollution tax  must 
increase.  
 
On the other hand, a higher transfer to the last period will mean the opposite sequence of events – 
leading to an increase in  1 t  and a lowering of the tax . As in the case with only the global cap, 
nothing can be said about the effect of a stricter global cap on its arrival date. This is shown in 
Fig. 9.  
 
It appears that the consequence of a stricter global mandate on the timing of the binding global 
cap depends crucially upon the properties of the demand function  () Dp. If the demand is highly 
                                                 
17 In the Appendix, we show that the time duration of the Hotelling phase is reduced. 23 
 
elastic, the direct effect of a stricter global mandate over the price  p will be low. The direct effect 
over p will thus be dominated by the indirect effect over the energy price before  2 t  and  2 t will 
decrease. The converse will happen in the case of an inelastic demand function.
18 
 
Fig 9. A stricter Global Mandate may also imply a shorter stay under the Local Cap  
and a smaller Local Tax. 
 
Finally we show the case when a stricter global mandate implies a longer stay under the local 
mandate and a higher local tax (see Fig. 10). 
 
In summary, tightening either the local or the global mandate delays the arrival of the clean 
substitute. Both policies also reduce the resource rent and therefore may lead to an increase in 
coal consumption. However whether action at one level mitigates the need for action at the other 
level depends upon parameter values such as the local curvature properties of the demand curve 
and the dilution rate of the atmosphere.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have examined the effect of a local emissions mandate and a global stock 
mandate on the extraction of a nonrenewable resource. We show that the effect of the two 
                                                 
18 The effect of a stricter global cap on the beginning of the binding global cap is independent of whether a local cap 
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Fig 10. A stricter Global Mandate may imply a longer stay under the Local Cap and a higher 
Local Tax. 
 
mandates on resource use may be quite different. The local mandate will always precede the 
global. If the local mandate is sufficiently stringent, it will make the global mandate unnecessary. 
We find that the effect of the mandates is especially sensitive to the price of the clean backstop 
resource. 
 
More importantly, we show that these mandates may have unintended consequences when their 
dynamic effects are taken into account. For example, tightening a mandate on the pollution stock 
may lead to increased pollution at the local level. When both mandates are present, tightening 
emission caps at the local level may lead to a quicker build-up of pollution and an earlier arrival 
at the global cap. This is because mandates leads to a decline in the value of the polluting 
resource and therefore under some conditions, consumption may actually increase. These insights 
are somewhat contrary to the impressions obtained from a static model, where different mandates 
may serve as substitutes. In a dynamic model, the effect of a policy intervention on the entire 
dynamic path is relevant and limiting pollution in one period may lead to an increase in another. 
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coordinated so that the policy instruments act as substitutes and not as complements. As this 
paper shows, the precise qualitative effects of policy changes are difficult to compute and will 
depend strongly on parameter values. 
 
But some key lessons can be learnt from this exercise. First the local mandate reduces pollution 
emissions and extends the life of the polluting resource and the arrival of the clean substitute. If 
the resource is abundant, the local mandate may not be able to prevent the stock of pollution from 
rising to the global cap. However, it may delay the time when the global mandate binds. What is 
interesting is that because the energy price always increases, once the global mandate binds, the 
local mandate ceases to play a role. 
 
These results are important because casual observation suggests that many local and regional  
jurisdictions are moving towards or have already implemented emission targets, while waiting for 
a global consensus to emerge, such as from the discussions following the Kyoto Protocol. The 
current state of negotiations suggest that an effective global agreement may take a long time to 
emerge. In the absence of coordination of these multiple efforts regionally and globally, it is not 
immediately apparent whether all efforts are beneficial both at the local and global level. As we 
show in our analysis, in some situations, a stricter mandate may lead to an increase in pollution.
  
 
Our model is highly aggregated and we have not considered multiple heterogenous regions or 
strategic behavior both at the local and global level. In future work, the model could be extended 
to consider one global mandate on the stock and possibly two regions such as the developed 
economies in the North and the developing economies in the South, each with its own emissions 
mandate. How will region-specific mandates affect resource use and the global stock of pollution 
when there is heterogeneity among regions? For example, the developed regions may have 
stringent local mandates (say, because of domestic environmental preferences) while the 
developing countries may prefer lax local standards. The effect of this divergence in the 
regulatory environment on the build-up of the stock of pollution and the arrival of the clean 
substitute may inform the policy debate on the dynamic consequences of multiple mandates.
  
 
The effects of the mandates upon the price of energy and on the price of pollution is a topic that 
needs to be explored further. The recent literature on the Green Paradox (Sinn, 2008, van der 26 
 
Ploeg and Withagen, 2010) highlights the importance of dynamic, supply-side effects of climate 
policies, as we do implicitly in our paper. For example, the behaviour of pollution permit prices 
as a result of the mandates will have important consequences for in-house abatement by firms as 
well as for research and development into energy alternatives. Another potential direction for 
future research is in examining how these mandates will affect use of energy sources with 
different pollution characteristics, such as coal and natural gas in power generation (Chakravorty, 
Moreaux and Tidball, 2008).  
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Appendix A: Equivalence between Multiple Symmetric Regions and a Single Region 
 
We would like to show that multiple symmetric regions imposing identical emissions mandates is 
equivalent to one region imposing a mandate. Assume that there are n symmetric regions labeled 
1,.., in  . Let  ( ) ( ) i i i v q v q  be the gross surplus of each region igiven local energy consumption
i q . Let the function vbe strictly increasing and concave with 




 . The average cost of 
coal is equal to  x c and same for all regions. 
 
Because of the choice of units,  () i xt is also the pollution emission in region i. The flow mandate 






Z t x Z 

  . The 
consumption of the clean substitute is given by  () i ytand its unit cost is  y c in all regions.  
 
Under these assumptions, because of symmetry, aggregate coal consumption  x must be allocated 




  and each region must consume the same quantity of solar 




  where  y is aggregate solar consumption. Then aggregate surplus defined by 




 . This function has the same qualitative properties as the function v
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    and satisfies 
the Inada property, 
0 0






    . The cap on emissions in each region may therefore 









x x nx x

    . 
Finally note that the dynamics of the pollution stock  () Ztdoes not depend upon the way the 
aggregate consumption of coal is divided among the regions.  
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Appendix B: Proofs of Propositions 
 
We perform a comparative dynamic exercise over the system of equations defining the vector  
0 0 1 2 3 ( , , , , , ) t t t T   with respect to x, the local mandate, andZ the global mandate. The variables 
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Denote bythe determinant of the first matrix on the left hand side. Then  
  1 2 0 0 ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) .
X Z Z X Z
y k t k t r r I I I I D c I            Appendix C shows that  0  . 
We can state the following:   
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Since ( ) 0 Dp   , the first term of the above sum is positive while the second term is negative. We 
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Appendix D shows that 
0 0   so that 1 /0 dt dx  . It is straightforward to see that the sign of 
2 / dt dxis indeterminate.                      
 
To examine the effect of a stricter local cap  0 dx  on 0  and on the energy price on the interval
12 [ , ) tt , we state the following Lemma.  
Lemma 2. Let 0 dx  . Define
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2/| | 0 dt dx   and energy prices fall everywhere in the interval  12 [ , ] tt ; and (iii) if  ˆ X HH   then 
0/| | 0 d dx   ,  2/| | 0 dt dx   and energy prices fall again during  12 [ , ] tt . 
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Here
X K measures the first order change in aggregate resource use from varying 0  during the 
period  12 [ , ] tt , and
X H for the period  3 [ , ] tT. From the definition of
X I , we get 
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where we use the definition of () ft. Since ( ) 0 ft  as shown before and ( ) 0 Dp   we conclude 
that absent any quantity effect after 3 t ,  0  should increase following a decrease in x. Let  
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from the definition of () f  . Then
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Note that ( ) 0 Dp    implies that () p At is an increasing function of time, 
1 0
t ee
   and  
2 0
t ee
    ,   12 ( , ) tt    which together imply that 1 ( ) 0 p At  and 2 ( ) 0 p At  . So () p Atchanges 
sign during the interval 12 ( , ] tt and there exists a unique  12 ˆ ( , ) t t t  such that 
ˆ 0  if 
( ) .








   
We conclude that, absent any quantity effect after  3 t , the energy price during  12 [ , ] tt should first 
decrease and then increase. But the quantity effect after  3 t given by
X H has a negative impact 35 
 
upon the energy price during  12 [ , ] tt . Thus 1 ( ) 0 p At in all cases. So 1 ( )/| | 0 dp t dx  . Since a 
stricter local mandate means a higher p during  1 [0, ) t ,  1 t  should increase. The decrease in the 
price before  1 t combined with the increase of p resulting from a stricter local mandate together 
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It is immediately checked that ˆˆ
p HH    . This completes the proof 
of Lemma 2.                       
                
We now check that the proof of Proposition 2 is complete. For 0 dx  , Lemma 1 gives 




x p t c e e
 
    , Lemma 2 yields 
( )/| | 0 dp t dx  ,  1 [0, ] tt  . Since ( ) ( ) t p p t    ,  1 [0, ) tt  , we have  ( )/| | 0 d t dx    establishing 
part (b). Lemma 1 also shows that 1/| | 0 dt dx  and   3/| | /| | 0 dt dx dT dx   , which prove parts 
(c), (d) and (e). Lastly, applying Lemma 2, we see that for a sufficiently low level of
X H , 
0/| | 0 d dx     and   2/| | 0 dt dx   , proving parts (f) and (g).           
              
We prove the following Lemma for the effect of a change in the global cap: 
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The sign of  0 / d dZ  is the sign of 
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0 /0 d dZ   . Since 
1
00 / ( / )( ) dT dZ d dZ r 






rt dt d e




   
and ( ) 0 Dp   give  3 /0 dt dZ  . Since p decreases when the global 
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. Relaxing the global mandate leads to a longer Hotelling 
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               which yields 0 /0 d dZ   . It is 
straightforward to check that the signs of  1 / dt dZ and  2 / dt dZ  are indeterminate, which 
completes the proof of Lemma 3.                 
 
For a stricter global mandate, we examine its effect on the energy price during the period  12 [ , ] tt , 
summarized as follows:  
 
Lemma 4.  When  0 dZ  , there exists
 
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Z HH  , the price of energy first falls then rises in the interval  12 [ , ) tt , i.e., 
1 ( )/| | 0 dp t dZ  ,  1/| | 0 dt dZ   and  /| | 0 d dZ   . (b) If   ˆ X
Z HH   the price of energy rises,
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where ()
X
p At and ()
Z
p At  have been defined earlier. Let 
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   ,  12 [ , ] tt    we have  1 ( ) 0
X
p At ,  1 ( ) 0
Z
p At  and  1 ( ) 0 p Bt . Conversely  
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p At  and 2 ( ) 0 p Bt   . Note that ()
X
p At and  
()
Z
p At  both decrease while () p Bt is strictly increasing during  12 [ , ] tt . In summary, absent any 
quantity effect beyond  3 t , the energy price should pivot in the interval  12 [ , ] tt , first falling after  1 t
then rising near  2 t . Since 0
X H  , a low level of 
X H will not qualitatively alter this result while a 
high level of 
X H will induce a global increase of () pt . Using the expressions for ()
X
p At , ()
Z
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and (A14), we can compute the critical level  ˆ
Z H  of 
X H such that  1 ( )/ 0 dp t dZ  . Then if
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Z HH  , 1 () pt decreases which implies that  1/| | 0 dt dZ   and  /| | 0 d dZ   .The converse occurs 
when ˆ X
Z HH  . This completes the proof of Lemma 4. 
 
Finally for 2/| | dt dZ , we can state: 
Lemma 5. Let 0 dZ  . Then (a) if 
2 /| | lim ( )/| | tt dp dZ dp t dZ   , then  2/| | 0 dt dZ  . The direct 
effect of  0 dZ  is higher than the indirect effect induced by the energy price variation on  12 [ , ] tt . 
So the global cap will start later in time. (b) If 
2 /| | lim ( )/| | tt dp dZ dp t dZ   , then  2/| | 0 dt dZ   . 
The direct effect of  0 dZ   is dominated by the indirect effect over the energy price path before 
the global ceiling period, so  2 t must decrease. 
Proof: Differentiating at time  2 t gives 
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where we denote the left hand side limit of () pt by
2 () pt  which is positive. Recall that as a function of time, () pt is not differentiable at  2 tt  . The 
first term inside the bracket on the RHS is positive since ( ) 0 Dp   and so is the second term since 
we have shown that  2 ( )/| | 0 dp t dZ   for all
X H . Hence the difference of the two terms is negative 38 
 
and  2 t declines.                       
 
In order to complete the proof of Proposition 3, check that from lemma 3,  0/| | 0 d dZ   and  
0/| | 0 d dZ   which establish claims 3(a) and 3(b). We also have  /| | 0 dT dZ  and  3/| | 0 dt dZ   
which establish 3(c) and 3(d). From Lemma 4, the sign of 1 / dt dZ is indeterminate which proves 
3(e). Lemma 5 shows that the time  2 t may either increase or decrease, which is 3(f). Finally, 
( ), t    1 [0, ] tt  may either increase or decrease from Lemma 4, which gives (g).       
             
Appendix C: Computation of the sign of  
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Appendix D: Computation of the sign of
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In Appendix B we have shown that 
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